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nm

SUPREME COJRT
OF THE

STA TE OF UTAH
HILL, by and through
her Guardian Ad Litem,
MARY HIIL FOGEL,

(
)
(
)
Plainti.f.f and Appellant, (
)
(

C~UDIA

vs.

GRAND CENTRAL,
A Corporation,

)

INC.,

Case No.

12082

(

)

(
De.f endant and Respondent.)
BRIEF OF APPEll.ANT

STATEMENT OF IBE KIND OF CASE
This is an action

brou~ht

by Claudia

Hill, a minor, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Mary Hill Fogel, against
the De.fendant Corporation upon an action
o.f a libel occasioned by the Respondent
discharging the Plaintif.f-Appellant .from
her employment as a Cashier on the grounds
1
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of misconduct, in that the station
which she operated had excess shortage
in the register.

The Appellant alleg-

ing that the false charge was injurious
to her in her trade and profession as a
Cashier, and further, was done with
malice and that there was a breech of a
conditional privilege and an excessive
publication of

sa~e.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Defendant-Respondent made a
Motion for Summary Judgment, U?On the
grounds that Appellant had failed to
produce evidence to support allegations
of actual malice on the part of the Respondent.

The M:>tion for

~mmary

Judgment

was granted by the Court in favor of the
Respondent and against the Appellant on
the O:>urt's finding of no cause of action.
2
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the
Lower Court's Order granting a Motion
for Summary Judgment of no cause of
action in favor of the Res?ondent, and
that the Supreme Court order, that the
case be remanded back to the Lower Court
so that the Appellant may have a jury
determine the facts and assess the damages
which were inflicted upon the Appellant
by the Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant, who was the Plaintiff in
the Lower Court, wi 11 be refer red to in
this Brief as Appellant, and the Defendant in the Lower Court will be referred
to in this Brief as Respondent.
The Aµpellant was employed by the
Respondent in a check-out station as a
Cashier, operating one of a number of
3
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such check-out stations on the premises
of the Respondent in Ogden, Utah.

(Rl)

The Respondent admits that the
monies in the register of the Cashier
was checked only one time in a twentyfour hour operational period (R6A), and
that there was no reconciliation of
money in the register, as the register
and its contents transferred from
Cashier to Cashier so that no individual
had personal resoonsibility for an accounting of the register totals at any time.
(R6A)

The Respondent further admits that
there were as many as six persons operating the same cash register during any
particular period during which the Appellant was in the employment of the said
Resoondent.

(R6A}

The Appellant has

alleged that there were many more than
six persons, during the course of a daily
4
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operation of the register, who would be
employed in handling the same register
and the same funds therein. (R8)

The

Appellant further has stated that some
of the persons who would be

call~d

upon

to operate the cash register during the
course of a day would be regular retail
sales personnel who had no training in
the capacity of Cashier.

(Rl)

The Respondent stated:
1.

That there was no record kept by

the Respondent as to the amount of money
in a register in relation to any particular cashier.
2.

(R6A)

That it did not keep records of

the daily employment shift of the cashiers
or their names.
3.

(R6A)

The Respondent has no knowledge

of any person or persons who have charged
the Plaintiff with the improper taking of
5
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funds from the Respondent. {R6A)
4.

That the Respondent has never

charged the Appellant with the taking
of funds.
5.

(R6A)
That the Respondent never had

any conversation with the

~ppellant,

charging or concerning the register
shortages. {R6A)
6.

That at various times during

the daily operation of the business,
money was removed from the various cash
registers and no record is kept of the
person or persons who are authorized to
remove such monies or the amount of money
so removed.

{R6A)

The Appellant was discharged from
her place of employment with the Respondent on December 21, 1969, {Rl) with the
only notice being a discharge slip which
stated on it that the reason for being
6
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r
I

fired was "misconduct" and that the
explanation on the slip fo~ the misconduct stated "excess shortage in the
register in which she worked." (Rl)
The libelous discharge slip was
written by Helen Fitzpatrick under the
orders of John Davis,

(R6A) the store

manager, the unsealed discharge slip
was then given to others and more than
five persons handled the libelous discharge order (R8) before its delivery
to the Appellant herein, Claudia Hill,
unenveloped and not sealed.

(Rl)

Upon Mo ti on of the Respondent for
a

~mr.ia

ry Judgment against the Appellant,

(Rll) the Lower Court issued an Order
that the Motion be granted,

(RlO) in that

the matter was one of conditional privilege and that the Appellant had produced
no evidence of actual malice, and that
it appeared that there was no genuine
7
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issue as to any material fact, thereby
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.
(RlO)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
GRANTING OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUJ)Q\iENT CANNOT ISSUE WHEN FACTS BEFORE
TIE Ca.JRT PRESENT TRIABLE ISSUES.
The Respondent's plea in a Motion
for Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy
and one that should not be granted except upon the clear showing that there
are not issues as to any material facts.
The Trial of any action based only upon
Affidavits and the Pleadings before the
Court is and can be self-serving.

It is

ordinary Hornbrook Law that the granting
of a Summary Judgment should be granted
only on a complete absence of any genuine
issues of fact apparent from the evidence
8
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before a Court, and that all doubts
thereon must be resolved against the
party moving for a summary Judgment.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure was not intended to provide a
substitute for the regular trial of
cases in which there are disputed issues
of fact upon which the outcome of the
litigation may depend, and it should be
invoked with caution, to the end that
litigants can be offered a trial, where
there is a bona fide dispute of the material facts.
Citing from Tennant vs. Peoria and
P. V. Ry. Company, 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct.
409, the Court stated on Page 412:

"It

is not the function of a Court to search
the record for conflicting circumstantial
evidence in order to take the case away

from a jury, on the theory that the case
gives equal support to inconsistent and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

uncertain inferences.

The focal point

of Judicial review is the reasonableness
of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury.

It is the Jury,

not the Court, which is a fact finding
party.

It weighs the contradictory evi-

dence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert
instructions, and draws the ultimate
conclusion as to the facts.

The very

escence of its function is to select,
from among the conflicting inferences and
conclusions,

that, which it considers

most reasonable.

The conclusions, whether

it relates to negligence, causation, or
other factual matter, cannot be ignored."
The Supreme Court of the United
States stated in Stevens vs. Howard D.
Johnson Company, 181 Fed.2d. 390:
"It must not be forgotten,

that in

actions at law, the Trial by Jury of
10
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--1

disputed questions of fact is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that even
questions of Law, arising in a case involving questions of fact, can be more
satisfactorily decided when the facts
are fully before the Court, than it is
possible on Pleadings and Affidavits.
The Motion for Summary Judgment authorized
by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which in effect legalizes
'speaking demurrer,' is an important case
1n preventing undue delays in the trial
of actions in which there is no real defense, but it should not be granted, only
where it is perfectly clear that no issue
of fact is involved and that inquiry into
the facts is not desirable to clarify the
application of the Law."
It has been further held, that the
above is true even where there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts in the
11
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case, but only as to the conclusions to
be drawn therefrom.

Hawkinson vs.

Dennis, 166 Fed.2d. 6lj also 152 Fed.2d.
453, 149 Fed.2d. 945; 133 Fed.2d. 17.
The Lower Court clearly evidenced this
very fundamental reason for a Jury evaluation of facts when, as the very basis
for the Lower Court's decision in the
case at bar, the Court stated as its
reason for granting the Summary Judgment,
"the words used in the discharge are as
capable of allegations of neglect or incompetency as the one of theft, being
caoable of either implication." (R16)
The Restatement, Torts, Section 614,
outlines the decision of functions between Judge and Jury in defamatory actions
as follows:
1.

Tile Court determines whether a

communication is ca:>able of a defamatory
meaning.
12
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2.

The Jury determines whether a

communication, capable of a defamatory
meaning, was so understood by its recipient.
The Lower Court stated the communication was "capable" of a defamatory
meaning.

( Rl6)

The Appellant did "under-

stand" the meaning to be defamatory.

(Rl)

Moore Federal Practice, Page 2115,
states:
"The Summary Judgment on Motion,
therefore, by a Defendant in an action,
should never be entered except where the
Defendant is entitled to its allowance
beyond all doubt.

To warrant its entry,

the facts conceded by the Plaintiff were
demonstrated beyond reasonable question
to exist, should show the right of the
Defendant to a Judgment with such clarity
as to leave no room for controversy, and
they should show affirmatively that
13
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Plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonable circumstances."
The Lower O:>urt, by its own direct statement,

(Rl6) acknowledged the very type of

interpretation that by every standard of
Constitutional Law is the function of a
Jury to weigh and determine, not a Court
on a Motion for Slmrnary Judgment.
It is submitted that Affidavits and
Pleadings are a dangerous and unsatisfactory substitute for oral testimony
before a Court and Jury.

The right of

examination and cross-examination in the
presence of the Trier of the Facts has
often

be~n

acclaimed as the most valuable

attribute of the Common Law system.

And

particularly in a case where the mo ti v-ati on may be an essential one for the
Trier of Facts, tu determine the truth by
bein9 able to observe the witnesses and
weigh motives against evidence and deQeanor
14
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to determine truthfulness, would seem
to be a basic and compelling issue to
do justice to the parties herein.

Credi-

bility and demeanor can be weighed only
by the Trier of Facts, which is not evidenced from Affidavits and Pleadings.
The Utah

<~preme

Court stated in

Samms vs. Eccles, 11 Ut.2d. 289; 358
P.2d. 344; "That some claims may be spurious, should not compel those who administer justice to shut their eyes to
serious wrongs and let them go without
being brought to account.

It is a

function of Courts and Juries to determine whether claims are valid or false.
This responsibility should not be shunned
merely because the task may be difficult
to perform."

The validity of the motives

of the Defendant in branding the performance of its employee, the Appellant
herein, as "misconduct" (Rl) in that
15
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there was excess shortage of the register
in which she

workec~,

( Rl) is shown by the

very statements of the Respondent itself
to be totally contradictory and is atodds with the statements of the Respondent,

(R6A) as evidenced from the Pleadings

and Affidavits in evidence before this
Court, and

~ust

in itself lend support to

the claim of the Appellant for injury per
se in the profession and occupation in
which she was engaged and evidences actual
malice by reason of its making and effect.
POINT II
AN EM?LOYERS PRIVILEGE IS A QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE ONLY.
The Utah Supreme Court in Williams
vs.

Standard Examiner Publishing Co:npany,

_N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r__2_8.....,_1_9_3_3....,_""_>7_,_P_._2_d_._l , stated in
its comprehensive coverage of a discussion
on qualified and cr,nditional privileges,
16
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that privileged communications rest upan
grounds of public policy, -

the necessity

of the individual to surrender his personal rights for the common welfare.

And

the Court further stated that "a qualified
privileged

com~unication

extends to all

communications made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which a party communicating has an interest, or in reference
to which he has a duty, to a person having
a corresponding interest or duty."

The

Court further pointed out, that the use
and calling upon the privilege, when
matters have been stated or written that
are untrue, and in such cases, the qualified or conditional privilege merely
raises a p rima facia :->resumption in favor
of the occasion, but qualified this privilege in stating,

that if a defamatory

matter was uttered or ~ublished with actual
cnalice, the qualified privilege would be

17
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lost; and further held that whether or
11ot a motive is malicious is generally
a fact question for a jury.
In

Spielbe~_vs.

A. Kuhn and Bros.,

January 23, 1911, 160 P. 1027, the Court
stated in this case, which concerned the
statements made by an employer of his
employee,
ments were

that whether or not the state~rivileged

depended upon

whether or not they were made in good
faith and without malice, and that both

of these questions were jury questions
and must be submitted to a jury for determination of such.
In the case at bar, we see where
from the Answers to the Interrogatories
and the Affidavit of the Appellant, it
is clearly set

fort~i

that there was no

possible way that the Respondent could,
or did determine, that the Plaintiff
herein had been dishonest in any manner
lK
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whatsoever,

(R6A) and that there was not

only no method or bookkeeping system for
contributing to any single employee, of
the large number of

e~ployees

who handled

the same money, in the same register,
during the course of a full days O?eration of such a cash register, (R6A) responsibility for a balanced cash register,
but that further, at no time was the
Plaintiff ever reprimanded, nor had discussions with management relative to any
alleged shortage in the register,

(R6A)

whether attributable to her conduct or
that of the many others with whom she
worked in the

sa~e

cash register.

Further,

the Respondent states flatly that he does
not believe, nor charge, that the Appellant
did take any of its funds,(R6A) nor was
there any specific way that the Appellant
could be charged with any contribution to
"excess shortage in the register in which
19
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J

she worked." ( R6A)

The Utah Supreme

Court in Combes vs.

Montgo~e.!.Y_

Ward &

Com?any, 228 P.2d. 272, wherein a
shortage of funds was discovered in a
cash register and the employee was discharged at the end of the day as a result
thereof, the Trial Court stated, that
taking the circumstances all together and
in discharging the employee at the end of
the day, the Court stated that this would
impute dishonesty to the Plaintiff and
amount to slander per se.

The Court

stating further, "It is not on the words
used, but their im?ort in the light of
all of the surrounding circumstances that
determines whether or not they are slanderous."
The

Ap?ellant'~

action, requires

l~ss

case herein in this
imagination for any

imputation of slander or libel per se, in
that upon being discharged, she was handed
20
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a discharge slip, which stated as the
reason for discharge "misconduct'' and
in explanation of the term, "misconduct,"
which is a requirement of the State of
Utah in the issuance of blue slips to
employees, it alleged "excess shortage
in the register in which she worked."
(R6A)

The Respondent herein would have

the Court believe that this on its face
imputed something other than exactly what
the words stated, that there was "misconduct" and there was "excess shortage."
{R6A)

These words are so plain and simple

that there is only one interpretation for
both of these elements taken together,
and that is the imputation and charge
that the conduct of Appellant herein was
as the words are set forth.
The Court in the

Co~bes

case, supra,

adopted the ruling of Harrison vs. Garrett,
132 N.C. 172, 43 S.E. 594, which was also
21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a case of a conditional privilege.

'The

Court stated, that such a qualified
privilege was protected where the writer
had an interest and the person addressed
had a corresponding interest or duty, and
that the statement was made in protection
of that interest, but it held further
that "There must be an honest belief in
the truth of the statement," and further,
that, when these facts are found to exist,
the communication is protected by the Law,
unless the Plaintiff can show malice on
the Defendant's part.

There can be no

basis for stating that the Respondent
herein had an honest belief in the truth

of the statement, in that every element
set forth in its own writings and in its
own Pleadings and Interrogatory Answers
(R6A) now before this Court, show that
there was no possible basis for believing
that the Ap?ellant herein had anything
22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

whatsoever to do with any 'misconduct'
on her part or 'excess shortage in her
register.'

And that, therefore, regard-

less of the existence, or non-existence,
of the privilege, the Respondent destroyed
the privilege by its lack of honest belief in its conduct.

It was further set

forth in the Combes case, supra, in
quoting from NewellL Slander and Libel,
on Page 1111; "The jury, however, will
be the proper tribunal to determine the
question of express malice where evidence
of ill will is forthcoming; but if, taken
in connection with admitted facts, the
words complained of are such as must have
been used honestly and in good faith by
the Defendant, the Judge may withdraw the
case from a jury, and direct a verdict for
the Defendant."
Newell on Slander and Libel, 3rd
Edition, Section 499, Page 480, further
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states "That the theory of privilege, in
connection with the Law of Defamation,
involves a variety of conditions of some
nicety, and also a doctrine not always
of easy application to a set of facts;
and such being the same in any trial,
whether civil or criminal, while the question of libel or not libel, malice or no
malice, are matters of fact for a jury,
the question of privilege or no privilge,
where the circumstances under which the
communication was made are not disputed,
is entirely one of Law for the Judge, but,
where such circumstances arP in doubt,
the jury must find what they were or what
the Defendant thou<Jht they were."

The

Court in the Stevens vs. Howard Johnson
~'

supra, in its Findings of Rights and

Privileges under conditional and privileged communications stated further, "It
follows,

therefore, that it was the duty
24
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of the Defendant to plead and prove the
communication made to the police officers
in the case at bar, was qualifiedly privileged."
Louisianna Oil Corporation, et al.,
vs. Sam Renno, 157

s.o.

705, 98 A.L.R.

1296, states, "A communication made in
good faith and on a subject matter in
which the person making it has an

interes~

or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person or persons
having a corresponding interest or duty,
even though it conveys matter which without this privilege would be slanderous,
provided the statement is made without
malice and in good faith.

The premise of

the Appellant in the Pleadings {Rl) and
Affidavit (RB) is sufficient to make, as
a question of fact for the Trier of Facts,
whether or not the statements of the Respondent can pass the qualification of
25
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"without malice and in good faith."

The

Court in the ~sianna Oil case, supra,
stated that the privilege is qualified,
in that protection is not absolute, but
depends entirely upon the honesty of
purpose with which a statement is made.
The Court further stated that the sincerity with which a statement is made, if so
found, does not alone justify the making
of the statements as there must be facts
and circumstances which reasonably impose
a duty to make the statements.

The evi-

dence before the Lower Court could not
justify the statements written.
Totten vs. Sun Printing & Publishing
Association, {1901; C.C.) 109 Fed. 289,
and annotated in 66 A.L.R. 1499, in discussing the case of an employer-employee
re la ti onshi p stated "It is generally held
that statements with reference to discharge
from private employment are qualifiedly
26
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privilege, if made by one having a duty
to make them or in response to an inquiry,
and if made to one having an interest in
the subject matter of the statement.

How-

ever, in accordance with the general
principles of libel and slander, if a
statement is made maliciously or with
intent to injure, the privilege is destroyed and the words are actionable."
While the Appellant makes no contest of
the right of her employer to discharge
her if the employer so saw fit, there can
be no justification for the libelous and
false accusation of misconduct on the
part of the Appellant and the charging
of excess register shortages to her, (R6A)
when the Respondent has admitted in its
Pleadings that the Appellant did not take
any funds from it (R6A), nor had ever
reprimanded or had information concerning
the Appellant which would in any way
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reflect or carry out the charges set
forth on the discharge slip. {R6A)

In

Pattison vs. Jones, 66 A.L.R. 1506,
the Court held "that even assuming
there is a privilege,

the question whe-

ther it was made with or without malice
was a question for the jury to determine."
In the instant case the Respondent
by its very own statements has lent no
credibility to its charge of "misconduct" and "shortage" on the part of the
Appellant.

(R6A)

The Respondent has

evidenced a proper basis of a charge of
actual malice, which is not lessened by
any alibi of not recognizing the meaning
of the harsh accusation evidenced by the
statements on the Appellant's discharge
order.

Tile Respondent had to be aware

that a "misconduct" discharge order
penalized the Appellant in being granted
unemployment compensation and stood forever
on the records of the Respondent
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and the State Employment files (R8)
forever branding the Appellant, a 17
year-old young lady, (Rl) from any
position of trust and reliability.

Any

inquiry to either of these two sources,
reporting the Appellant's discharge for
"misconduct" and excessive shortage in
the register which she worked," (R6A)
could not possibly receive the charitable interpretation of the Lower Court
that they inferred mere incompetency.
{Rl6)

This Court is further prayed to

find one iota of basic fact to support
even a shred of truth in the libelous
charge of "incompetency" in the record
before this Court.
There is absolute clarity in the
clear meaning of the words used by the
Defendant in regards to the Appellant,
and the Court stated in D. F. Marion vs.
Minnie Davis, 55 A.L.R. 171, "The right
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to the enjoyment of a private reputation,
unassailed by malicious slander, is of
ancient origin, and is necessary to
human society.

A good reputation is an

element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with
the right to the enjoyment of life,
liberty, and property."

The Court fur-

ther stated in ref erring to the statements
made by the Defendant concerning the Plaintiff, "That words are to be taken in their
natural meaning and according to the sense
to which they appeared to have been used,
and the idea they are adopted to convey to
those who heard them.

A forced construc-

tion is not to be put on them in order to
relieve the Defendant from liability."
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Company vs. Carl Ingle, 229 Ky. 578, 17 S.W.
2d. 709, was an action wherein a Chauffer
was discharged by his employer for
30
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drinking, allegedly during the hours of
his employment.

The words made public

stated, "Ingle discharged for drinking."
The Court stated, that in their ordinary
acceptance, the meaning of the words
would be that he was unfit for his occupation by reason of his indulgence in
drinking.

The Court stated, "It is uni-

formly held that words falsely spoken or
written are libelous per se, if they
impute unfitness to perform the duties
of an office or employment, or if they
prejudice a person in his profession or
trade."

In comparing these words with

the words of the Respondent in the instant case, the allegation that a Cashier
had "excessive shortage in her register"
and had been discharged for "misconduct"
can only impute unfitness.

The Lower

Court stated that the words used in the
discharge, "are as capable of allegations
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of neglect or incompetency as they are
of theft, being capable of either implication.''

It was stated in Miles vs.

Louis Wasmer, Inc., Supreme Court of
Washington, 20 P.2d. 847, "In determining whether the words spoken were defamatory, they must be construed in the
sense in which they would ordinarily be
understood by persons hearing them."
It is submitted to this Honorable
Court that the term "misconduct" coupled
with the phrase "excess shortage in her
register" if it does have a dual meaning,
its ordinary meaning would be exactly
what it sets forth, in that "misconduct"
itself means a wrongdoing.

In Pattison

vs. Jones, supra, the employer in referring to a former employee wrote to a
prospective employer that the "Plaintiff
had been discharged for

'misconduct'."

The Court held that the question of malic~

32
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by reason of the use of the term "misconduct," was in itself a question for
the jury to determine.

In Porak vs.

SWeitzers, Inc., Supreme Court of Montana,
237 P. 633, the Court stated that "Opprobrious words must be construed according
to their usual popular and natural meaning and common acceptance."
Yelle vs. Cowles Publishing Company,
9.lpreme Court of Washington, 278 P.2d.
671, referring to a slander, wherein there
was no unconditional privilege, stated,
"words spoken, however, which are not in
fact true, are not privileged."

Reed vs.

Melnick, Court of Appeals of New Mexico,
462 P.2d. 148, the Court adopted the
statement of Prosser, Law of Torts, Section 107, at 780, 3rd Edition, 1964, in
stating, "It is generally held that words
falsely written of a party, which prejudice such party in his occupation or
33
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trade, are actionable per se."
I. Harper and James, the Law of
Torts, Section 5.12, at 381, 1956, makes
the following statement:

"The Law of

Defamation has always stressed the pecuniary aspects of injury to reputation.
It is to be expected, therefore, that
special emphasis was placed on those defamatory charges, the tendency of which
was to interfere with ones livelihood."
Kee vs. Armstrong, Byrd & Company,
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 182 P. 494,
"Words used in an alleged slanderous
communication article are to be construed
by the most natural and obvious meaning,
and in a sense that would be understood
by those to whom it was addressed.''
Washer vs. Bank of America National
Trust & Saving Association, Supreme Court
of California, 136 P.2d. 297, was a case
wherein an employee brought an action
34
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against his employer for libel and slander.
The Court stated "insofar as Fenton's
statement tended to injure the Appellant
in his occupation, it was unnecessary for
him to allege special damages."

The Court

held, "The :Appellant has alleged, not only
that the statement is fa.lse, but also that
it was known by Penton to be false at the
time he made it, and, furthermore, that he
did not have probable or any cause for believing it to be true.

In addition, he

has alleged that the statement was made
for the purpose of injuring, disgracing,
and defaming him, and interferring with
his ability to obtain employment.

Such

allegation constitutes a clear and definite pleading of malice in fact."

The

instant case is on all fours with this
statement of legal doctrine.
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POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO GENUINE
ANO FULL DISCOVERY BEFORE JUDICIAL IETERM INA TION.
A chronology of the time element in
this case is essential in order to make
the point herein desired to be established.
A Complaint was filed on January 6,
1970, (Rl) and a Glardian Ad Litem approved for the minor Appellant on January 8, 1970, (R3) with the 9leriff's
return of service being made on January 12,
1970. (Rl3)

No Answer was filed by the

Respondent, but a Motion to .Dismiss was
made on January 23, 1970. (R4)

February 5,

1970, the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the Appellant thirty days
to establish evidence of malice. (R4) The
Appellant served Interrogatories February
25, 1970, (RS) and Answers to the Interrogatories were mailed by the Respondent
36
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March 3, 1970. (R6A)

Motion for Summary

Judgment was made March 17 without Affidavit by the Respondent.

(R6)

Affidavit

in Denial of Motion was filed by Appellant
March 31. (RS)

Summary Judgment was

granted to the Respondent by the Lower
Court on April 3, 1970. (RlO)
The Lower C.ourt at the granting of
the Motion stated as a conclusion, "as
far as I know, there has been no other
effort to take Depositions or anything
else.

It would appear to the Court that

the Plaintiff

***

has been given a reason-

able amount of time to produce evidence
or show that he has some and has not done
so.

The action appears to be one of har-

assment.

The Motion to Dismiss is granted."

(R16)
Am. Jur. on Pleadings, Section 332,
states that a Motion to Dismiss conceeds
the truth of the matters alleged if they
37
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are well pleaded, and construes the allegations of a pleading most favorable in
the Pleader's favor; and further states,
that the Complainant is entitled to the
benefit, not only of the facts stated in
the Bill, but also to legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom.

Stryker vs.

Barbers Super Market, Inc., Court of

Ap-

peals in New Mexico, December 1969, 462
P.2d. 629, was an action for libel.

Dle

Court stated, "A Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pleaded facts.

***"

***

admits well

This Court also

adopted the statement of Stewart vs. Ging,

64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d. 333, 1958,and
stated,

"Thus, when the Trial Court dis-

mi ssed the Complaint, it was admitted
that Defendants had included defamatory
matter in the Bernalillo County Complaint
and it done so falsely and maliciously."
38
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February 5, 1970, the Court in its
Order denied the Motion to Dismiss, but
alleged that Paragraphs ten and eleven of
Appellant's Complaint alleged actual malice; and for that reason, the Complaint
did not state a claim, but did grant the
Appellant thirty days to establish evidence of actual malice; her failure to so
do resulting in the granting of a Summary
Judgment for the Respondent. (R4}
The Appellant seeking adequate discovery to comply with the Order of the
Court, on February 25, 1970, delivered to
the Respondent's,

Interrogatories to be

answered fully, completely, and with a
revelation of all known facts within the
knowledge of the Respondent.

(RS)

The

Respondent's Answer to the Interrogatories
were posted in the mail to the Appellant
on March 3, 1970,

(R6A) but were not com-

plete, did not fully reveal the information
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known to the Respondent, and the Affiant
thereto was the Attorney for the Respondent.

The Affidavit of the Affiant was

made by the Attorney for the Corporate
Chain Respondent, who stated, "That he
makes these foregoing Answers to Interrogatories on behalf of the Defendant as
its Attorney for the reason that Affiant
is better informed as to the information
necessary to answer Defendant's Interrogatories." {R6A}

The sincerity and compe-

tency of the Affiant is not questioned,
but it is noted that the Respondent's
Answers to the following Interrogatories
is not on all fours with the Affidavits
and Pleadings of the Appellant:

1, 2, 3,

7, 20, 21, and 22.
The Motion for Summary Judgment was
heard on the 3rd day of Apri 1, 1970, {R6)
and the Court, having before it only the
Pleadings of the Appellant and the Affidavit
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of the Appellant in denial thereof,
issued the Order granting the ~tion for
Summary Judgment.

(RIO)

The Lower Court

based its ruling, as shown by the Court
Transcript, on the premise that the Court,
while recognizing that the statements of
the Respondent could imply theft, chose
to make a Judicial interpretation that it
was also capable of only meaning neglect
or incompetency, and further,

that the

Appellant "has no evidence that the allegation is not true.

The Defendant has

evidence that there were shortages in
the ti 11.

The Plaintiff has no evidence

of any hatred or ill will ***·" (R16)
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that formal exceptions
to rulings or orders of the Court are
unnecessary, but it is sufficient if the
party makes known to the Court the action
which it desires,

takes his objection to
41
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the action of the Court and his grounds
therefore.

The Transcript will reveal

that Counsel for the Appellant did all
of these and further, alleged that Appellant had not yet completed the discovery
necessary in an action of this type, (Ra)
and

th~

record will show that no Readiness

for Trial had been filed by the Appellant
herein.
Scoville vs. Kellogg

~les

Company,

Supreme Court of Utah, 261 P.2d. 933, is
authority by the Supreme Court of Utah,
that on Appeal by Plaintiff from a Judgment entered on a direct verdict of no
cause of action, the Court is required to
review the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff-Appellant.

It was

further held by this Court in Kirchgestner
vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad,
233 P.2d. 699, that clear and convincing
evidence and proof of such is only in such
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instance as there remains no serious
doubt or substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion; and further, that the mind has been persuaded
by the evidence before it as to the probable truth or correctness of the facts
it purports to prove.

'Olis Court has

further stated in Ulibarry vs.

Olristenso~

275 P.2d. 170, that an additional basis
for the granting of a Summary Judgment on
an affirmative defense, that the degree
of evidence and proof in such an instance
must be clear, unequivocol, and convincing.

It is submitted to this Court that

through even the use of the ''Preponderance
Rule of Evidence," the evj dence of the
Respondent herein must fall far short of
its mark.
Rules 26 to 37 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure show by reason of the
discussions of the Compilers notes con43
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tained as footnotes under these varjous
rules, the addition of these rules was
with the intent of an adoption of a liberal method of fact finding, and its
purpose is in general aid to Rule 8 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
is set forth in (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the
Pleader is entitled to relief.

This

Court stating in Campbell vs. Taylor, 3
Utah 325, 3 P. 445, ''A Complaint need
allege no more than will constitute prima
facia, a cause of action, or defense; all
beyond this is surp !usage."

The SUpreme

Court of Nevada in Dodd vs. Cowgi 11, 463
P.2d. 482, December 1969, stated, "The
District Judge found that the Answers to
Respondent's Request for Admissions
failed to comply with N.R.C.P. 36, in
that the Answers were not truthful and
were not set forth with the specificity
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,
required by the Rule.

We agree."

It is

further set forth in Barron and Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Section

834, Page 513, in discussing Requests for
Admissions, that "The admissions or denials
must be forthright, specific, and unqualified."
The Utah S\lpreme Court in Blackham
vs. Snellgrove, February 28, 1955, 280
P.2d. 453, adopted the language of Mr. Justice Murphy, who stated in the Hickman vs.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 SS. Ct. 385, "The
Pre-Trial Deposition-Discovery Mechanism
established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of
the most significant innovations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under

the prior Federal practice, the Pre-Trial
functions of notice-giving issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed
primarily and adequately by the Pleadings.
Inquiry into the issues and the facts
45
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before trial was narrowly confined and
was often cumbersome in method.

The new

Rules, however, restrict the Pleadings
to the task of general notice-giving and
invest the Deposition-Discovery process
with a vital role.in the preparation before trial."
CONCLUSION
IT IS SUBMI !TED TO THIS HONORABLE
OOURT IllA T IT WI\ S ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDI CT CF SUMMARY JUDG'IENT AND THAT THIS WAS
A PROPER CASE FOR SUBMISSION TO A JURY,
FOLLOWING A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR FACT
FINDING AND DISCDVERY.

n1E

~SE

JUSTICE REQUIRES

BE R91ANIED TO n-IE DISTRICT <X>URT

FOR TRIAL BY JURY.
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